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19481 RECENT DECISIONS
incumbrance, for the court specifically states that it is not an incum-
brance. Furthermore if it were an incumbrance, the vendee would
not have been liable under the contract, as it released him if the title
to either lot were unmarketable. Therefore, the case of subsequent
zoning regulation must be treated as an exception to the general rule
in New York, that where a bargain is fair when made, the fact that
changing circumstances have made it a hard one, is no defense to
specific performance.' 0
M. S. R.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL AGREEMENT FOR PARTITION OF
LAND-INVALIDITY OF DEFENSE OF ORAL AGREEMENT NOT TO PAR-
TITION IN ACTION BROUGHT FOR PARTITION.-An action was brought
in the Court of Chancery in New Jersey for the partition of land.
The defendants interposed an answer alleging that they and the com-
plainants agreed orally with each other not to bring any suit for the
partition of land before August 23, 1948, the maturity date of a cer-
tain mortgage. The complainants moved to strike out the answer
upon the ground that the alleged agreement was unenforcible under
those sections of the New Jersey Statute of Frauds known as R. S.
25:1-2 and 5(d) N. J. S. A. The first of these sections provides
that no interest in real estate shall be surrendered unless by deed or
note in writing. The second that no action shall be brought upon an
"oral contract or sale of real estate, or any interest in or concerning
the same." Held, that the agreement set forth in the answer was
within the statute and unenforcible, constituted no defense to the ac-
tion and had to be stricken out. Wujciak v. Wujciak, et al., - N. J.
Eq. -, 55 A. 2d 164 (1947).
The precise question involved apparently had never previously
been presented to the New Jersey courts for consideration; but the
second section of the statute which forbids the bringing of an action
has been construed to preclude the use of such an oral contract as a
defense.'
The court found support for its conclusion in other comparable
situations. Thus it was held that the oral consent of one who enjoys
an easement of light and air that the owner of the servient tenement
might build in disregard of the easement was unenforcible; 2 likewise
the oral permission given an abutting owner to erect a building en-
-0 Sanford v. Smith, - Misc. -, 66 N. Y. S. -d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Urbis
Realty Co. v. Globe Realty Co., 235 N. Y. 194, 139 N. E. 238 (1923) ; Froehlich
v. K. W. W. Holding Co., 116 Misc. 275, 190 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
I Brands v. Cassidy, 125 N. J. Eq. 346, 5 A. 2d 685 (Ch. 1939); id., 124
N. J. Eq. 417, 1 A. 2d 639 (Ch. 1938).2 Ware v. Chew, 43 N. J. Eq. 493, 11 Atl. 746 (Ch. 1888).
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croaching on the complainant's land.3  Among other oral agreements
or surrenders which were held unenforcible are the following: an
agreement by a land owner with his next door neighbor restricting
the use of his land,4 a promise by a mortgagee, after default, not to
take possession,5 also an agreement not to foreclose a mortgage for
a certain time upon the premise that the mortgage was an interest in
land and the privileges and powers inherent in it are also interests in
land. A necessary characteristic of a mortgage would be lacking if
there was no power to enforce payment by foreclosure.0
At common law and before the enactment of the Statute of
Frauds tenants in common of land could makq a partition thereof by
parol by delivery of seizin or actual delivery of possession of the
land.7 The reason was that the only privity between them was pos-
session. If that was severed in a lawful manner they each held their
estates in severalty, absolutely. No deed was necessary. This did
not apply to joint tenants however, for neither could make delivery
to the other.8
However, the rule that the Statute of Frauds is applicable to a
parol or verbal partition is not universal.9 In the majority juris-
dictions which hold that a parol partition is within the Statute of
Frauds and therefore unenforcible as lacking the essential require-
ments of being in writing, the rule is predicated upon the premise
that there is involved a transfer or release of an interest in land
which comes within the letter and spirit of the Statute of Frauds.10
In those jurisdictions which give validity to a parol partition,
the theory is that such partition is not a conveyance or sale of the
land within the meaning of the statute, but simply a segregation of
that part of the land held in common which belongs to each tenant
in common.
In some of these' jurisdictions, however, which enforce parol
agreements for partition, the decisions seem to rest upon the differ-
ence in language employed in the statute. Thus, the English statute
embraces not only a sale of- the land, but any interest in or concern-
ing it; while in other statutes the language is confined to the sale
3 Capone v. Ranzulli, 99 N. J. Eq. 627, 134 At. 553 (Ch. 1926).
4 Droutman v. E. M. & L. Garage, 129 N. J. Eq. 1, 19 A. 2d 25 (Ch. 1940).
5 Montuori v. Bailen, 290 Mass. -72, 194 N. E. 714 (1935); see Note, 97
A. L. R. 789 (1935).
6 George v. Meinersmann, 119 N. J. L. 460, 197 Atl. 1, 2 (1938). But cf.
Tompkins v. Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. 338 (Ch. 1871), and Van Syckel v.
O'Hearn, 50 N. J. Eq. 173, 24 Ati. 1024 (Ch. 1892), in which such contracts
were enforced on principles of promissory estoppel because the mortgagor had
changed his position in reliance on the extension of the mortgage.
7 Berry v. Seawall, 65 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 6th 1895) ; Wood v. Fleet, 36
N. Y. 499 (1867).
8 Docton v. Priest, 78 Eng. Rep. 354 (1588).
9 See Note, 133 A. L. R. 485-487 (1939).10 Berry v. Seawall, mtpra.
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of land. Accordingly, on the theory that partition is not a sale of
land, but only a separation between joint owners or tenants in com-
mon of their respective interests in land, parol partitions have been
held valid."
In the great majority of the jurisdictions it has been held that
irrespective of whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable, parol par-
tition is valid where the parties to the agreement have taken pos-
session in severalty of the respective portions allotted to them pur-
suant to such agreement.12
In some cases, however, it has been held that a parol partition of
land is void as being within the Statute of Frauds even though pos-
session in severalty is taken thereunder.' 3
In striking out the answer in the instant case, the court noted
the absence of any allegation therein that the defendants had been
induced to take or abstained from any action by the complainant's
alleged promise not to bring any suit for partition. The agreement
was executory on both sides and accordingly invalid within the terms
of the Statute of Frauds. When there has been an actual execution
of the oral contract equity will enforce the agreement.' 4
D. M. S.
TAXATION - ESTATE TAX - APPORTIONMENT - DECEDENT
ESTATE LAw § 124.-This is a proceeding in the matter of the estate
of Ogden Livingston Mills, upon the final accounting of his execu-
tors.
The deceased created three revocable inter-vivos trusts for the
benefit of various individuals in the six-year period before his death
in 1937. The trustees object to the executors' proposed allocation of
estate taxes from the principal of said trusts on the ground that a
codicil to the decedent's will provides for the payment of such taxes
out of the general estate. Payment of counsel fees from the dece-
dent's estate was also requested.
The codicil in dispute stated: "I direct that all estate, inheri-
tance, transfer and succession taxes imposed upon my estate or any
"lMeacham v. Meacham, 91 Tenn. 532, 19 S. W. 757 (1892); McKnight
v. Bell, 135 Pa. 358, 19 Atl. 1036 (1890) ; Moore v. Kerr, 46 Ind. 468 (1874).12 Sanger v. Merritt, 131 N. Y. 614, 30 N. E. 100 (1892) ; Taylor v. Mil-
lard, 118 N. Y. 244, 23 N. E. 376 (1890) ; Wood v. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 499 (1867);
Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N. Y. 257 (1850).
23 Fort v. Allen, 110 N. C. 183, 14 S. E. 685 (1892); Ballot v. Hale, 47
N. H. 347 (1867); Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 34 (1812).
. 14 Jones v. Jones, 118 App. Div. 148, 103 N. Y. Supp. 141 (1st Dep't 1907),
citing Wood v. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 499 (1867), and Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y.
244, 23 N. E. 376 (1890).
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